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This paper offers a comprehensive set of explanations for why people vote. Based on evidence 
from Indian elections, where voter turnouts remain consistently high and rising despite voting 
not being compulsory, the paper shows that two broad sets of reasons exist. First, a set of 
transactional factors, labelled ‘money’ here, that encompass within it the instrumental and 
coercive reasons that propel people to vote. Secondly, evidence shows that people also 
attribute ‘meaning’ to the act of voting itself as they vote for the sake of performing the act 
itself. Drawing from the wider literature and the author’s own ethnographic work including 
comparative ethnographic research conducted by a team across India, the paper brings 







Across democracies in the world, people’s decision to vote or not vote in elections is the result 
of a combination of several predictable and unpredictable factors1. There is a wide variety of 
democratic societies in the twenty first century world, and each creates a context-specific 
version of a commonly held set of ideas of what constitutes democracy. In its current resurgent 
phase over the last two hundred years or so, democracy has come to stand for both a common 
set of aspirations as well as an enormous variety in how these are embedded in particular social 
contexts. It is worth noting that in the very title of his classic work, Democracy in America 
Tocqueville draws our attention to how the ideas of modern democracy born in the context of 
post-revolutionary France took root and flowered in the very different context of the New 
World. He noted with admiration the successful establishment of a democratic ethic in America 
that far outstripped its French roots where post-revolutionary disorder continued to reign. 
Despite the aristocracy of his birth and intellectual genealogy that no doubt influenced his 
ambivalence towards the virtues of democracy as a political form, the French philosopher 
displays little chauvinism at how America adopted and adapted democratic ideas for its 
purpose.  Instead he focused his attention on the specific context and the particular 
combination of factors that made American democracy what it was. It is in this sort of 
Tocquevillian vein that anthropologists and ethnographers of politics have lately been at the 
forefront of articulating the context-specific nature of democratic practice in the contemporary 
world. While the study of democracy and its institutions has been of relatively recent interest 
in political anthropology, a proliferation of recent studies have nevertheless showed, both with 
the weight of evidence as well as theoretical innovation, that it is precisely this variation that 
lies at the heart of democratic ideas and its continued popularity as the least bad system of 
government2.  
 
The importance of elections in installing democratic governments has also been widely studied 
and there is near universal agreement among scholars of all disciplines that while elections are 
not a sufficient indicator of modern democracy they are nevertheless an essential indicator3. A 
country cannot be classified a democracy unless it holds regular elections and there is also 
general agreement that participation in elections is a useful indicator of the health of 
democratic arrangements, especially in those countries where it is not compulsory to vote4.  A 
decline in voter turnouts therefore causes concern, as it is a clear indication of a disengaged or 
disenchanted electorate and for a democratically elected government to be genuinely for, of 
                                                      
1 Acknowledgements: The argument presented here has been formulated over a number of years and many have 
contributed to its development. My particular thanks to Jonathan Spencer, Yogendra Yadav, Akhil Gupta, Thomas 
Blom Hansen, Pradeep Chibber, Mekhala Krishnamurthy, Manisha Priyam, Kanchan Chandra, Nick Long, Deborah 
James, Lisa Bjorkman and David Gilmartin (the last two for also commenting on an earlier draft of this paper) and 
to Norbert Peabody and two anonymous reviewers for this journal. Thanks to Rebecca Bowers for research 
assistance.   
2 In 2007 when the volume Anthropology of Democracy (ed Paley) was published there were only a handful of 
political anthropologists who explicitly worked on democracy.   
3 This is not however to advocate a minimalist view of democracy. I appreciate Lisa Wedeen’s spirited critique of 
such a view in Peripheral Visions (2008) especially in Chapter 3 pp103-147. 




and by the people, a greater aggregate of people involved in selecting the government is of 
crucial importance. Thus, it is reasonable to surmise, that the probity of electoral procedure and 
the rates of voter turnouts are immensely important features of any modern democracy, 
regardless of social context. Given this, the case of Indian democracy with the largest electorate 
in the world of over 815 million voters, is an interesting one.  India’s record on non-electoral 
indicators of a democracy, namely, human rights, accountability of the elected and 
transparency of institutions is mixed, there is a considerable ‘liberal deficit’ and the legitimacy 
of the state and its actors, including the political establishment, is low (Varshney 2007). Despite 
this, Indians are enthusiastic voters and vote in ever increasing numbers at all levels of elections. 
The challenge for observers of Indian democracy is therefore to explain this seeming 
contradiction i.e. why do people continue to vote enthusiastically despite the failure of 
governments to perform in their interests?5 This paper is a response to this challenge.  
 
Elections in India have two seemingly contradictory impulses; on the one hand, they are 
conducted to a high degree of efficiency with elections held on time and in a largely ‘free and 
fair’ manner which given the impoverished state of infrastructure in the country and general 
record of non-performance by public officials, is extraordinary 6 . Yet elections are also 
dominated by enormous amounts of unaccounted cash, violence and intimidation by political 
actors who attempt to influence the outcome through these means. Thus, there is widespread 
use of coercion while also a high degree of electoral participation. The task of explaining rising 
voter turnouts within such a contradictory scenario is thus tricky because it is hard to determine 
whether the use of money, and its accompanying practices of violence, incentives, vote-buying, 
intimidation and criminality drive people to the polling station, that is, do people vote because 
they are compelled to?  The contradiction raises further questions - Do indirect transactional 
processes such as patronage and public services also affect turnout? Is there any voluntary 
engagement by voters or is their motivation to vote solely driven by incentives and intimidation? 
Does the choice of who to vote for determine whether they will vote at all? Does anyone vote 
because they think it is important to vote? Does the act of voting in itself hold any meaning for 
voters?  
 
The scholarship on Indian elections often links transactional motivations to electoral outcomes, 
thereby identifying the role that identity, money and muscle play in determining popular choice 
at elections. This literature is diverse and rich and goes a long way in explaining voter 
motivations 7 . To these, I will add in this paper, based on my own long-term village-level 
anthropological research as well as data from a comparative ethnographic project conducted 
by a team during the 2009 national elections, additional meanings that voters attach to the act 
                                                      
5 In a recent paper Laura Zimmerman indicates that voter turnout increases in areas with higher implementation 
quality of government led welfare programmes such as MNREGA, a rural employment guarantee scheme. Such 
analyses of linking voter turnout with government performance or other factors are however rare (Zimmerman 
2016). 
6 See Gilmartin 2016 pp1-3 for an examination of the ‘free and fair’ nature of Indian elections. It should also be 
noted that India has among the highest numbers of ‘election petitions’ in the world and the conduct of elections 
is not uniformly efficient everywhere. However, given the scale of the exercise (1 million electronic voting 
machines, 12 million election officials, over 900,000 polling booths) elections in India are considered to be within 
acceptable levels of procedural efficiency. 
7 The existing rich literature on Indian elections focuses largely on whom i.e. which party and candidate for people 




of voting. Research has revealed that while it was evident that elections were indeed dominated 
by money, violence and patronage, voters were nevertheless able to preserve a sense of 
citizenship in their individual act of casting a vote. When asked directly what the vote meant to 
them, voters focused on the actual experience of voting and explained that they considered the 
act of voting a rare and precious performance of a highly personal civic duty that allowed them 
to experience political equality and democratic values that were otherwise invisible in everyday 
life8. Performed citizenship of this sort was as much an interior state as it was a public duty, and 
signified individual dignity and selfhood that was prior and foundational to any future claim 
making as citizens. It was for this reason that they considered elections as precious and 
sacrosanct events, despite their association with the venality of politicians, money and its 
practices.  While they acknowledged that they usually had to vote for someone, their decision 
to vote at all was because the act of voting in itself held meaning.   
 
I propose in this paper that any theory of the vote in India needs to accommodate both of these 
instrumental and expressive aspects of the vote as both these strands co-exist, despite their 
seeming contradiction. I shall examine each of these aspects in turn; in the first half of the paper, 
I will examine the more transactional aspects of elections that include a diverse set of practices 
from vote buying to patronage. These various practices work in different temporal cycles of 
immediate transaction versus long-term relationships of clientilism, which when taken together 
explain the instrumental factors that determine electoral choice and in turn voter participation. 
I will then present the second set of explanations that people themselves offered when asked 
directly ‘why do you vote?’ These were elicited during my own research over several elections 
and during a comparative study conducted across India during the national elections in 20099. 
It is revealing that while all of the factors described in the first part of the paper, namely the 
more instrumental ones, continued of course to affect voters during the 2009 elections, when 
researchers directly asked voters why they voted, people used the opportunity to explain what 
the vote meant to them and offered additional reasons.  Thus, by  placing these various 
motivations within the same explanatory frame, I hope to offer a comprehensive theory of the 
vote in India.  
 
‘Money’ and elections  
 
It is evident to anyone studying elections in India that they involve considerable sums of money. 
Full page advertisements on the front of major newspapers, gigantic hoardings along highways 
and in cities, cameras that amplify the size of crowds at public meetings and feed footage 
directly to TV stations, holograms of candidates that magically appear on a stage while they are 
physically elsewhere and so on - are all expensive devices of political campaigning. Less visible, 
but just as effective are ‘paid news’ or ‘advertorials’ reporting the virtues of certain candidates 
or the scandals of another depending on who is paying. Elections also cause a sudden spate of 
‘weddings’ and ‘birthday parties’ that call for mass feasting hosted by political parties for their 
                                                      
8 This is not to analytically fetishize ‘the electoral moment’ but take seriously the explanations that voters 
themselves offered as their reasons for voting. 
9 The field research for the comparative electoral ethnographies project was focused on four questions framed by 
me for the larger project, and was conducted over one month before and during the 2009 general elections in the 
12 sites. The researchers of the project submitted reports from their respective field sites and the material was 
integrated from the original reports with material from my own fieldwork in the publication Why India Votes? 
(2014). Both in Why India Votes? and in this paper, information taken from the field reports submitted by the 
researchers is indicated with a reference (FR: original page number). 
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workers, fixers and constituents, and money is also spent on ‘rent-a-crowd’ mobilised for 
political rallies. Less visibly, candidates and political parties hand out cash and incentives directly 
to individuals to use as they as they see fit to entice constituents. All these money-rich tactics 
aim to create shock and awe by a political party, change people’s opinions by bombarding them 
with messages or simply to cultivate support among people that be harvested in the form of 
votes. There is little regulation of ‘money’ in Indian elections and the only cap on expenditure 
is for individual candidates and not political parties and the money that is spent during elections 
is often from unaccounted funds making it impossible to find hard evidence of actual figures of 
expenditure or their sources. This causes wild variations across parties and candidates in their 
campaign strategies and makes for an extremely uneven playing field. The Election Commission 
of India, despite its vigilance and desire to do so, spectacularly fails to control expenditure in 
elections.  
 
The practice of such widespread unaccounted election expenditure by political parties can be 
traced back to 1969 when India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi banned corporate donations to 
political parties. Prior to that time, such donations were recorded and they were available for 
scrutiny10. Though the lion’s share of donations went to the Congress, Mrs Gandhi’s party which 
was the dominant one at the time, and her action was designed to starve the opposition parties 
of funds to silence criticism; businesses that were critical of Mrs Gandhi’s increasingly ‘socialist’ 
politics were willing to fund rival political parties to the Congress. The ban and simultaneous 
growing government control of business had two major effects: it choked off funds to the 
opposition and it simultaneously allowed the Congress administration to extract extortionist 
amounts of unaccounted money from corporations for licenses to trade. From this point on, the 
relationship between money and political influence in Indian politics has remained 
unaccounted, opaque and part of the black economy. To assess the linkages between money 
and elections is thus a tough challenge for any scholar. And to demonstrate the linkages 
between money spent and electoral outcome is an even greater challenge. But some excellent 
research exists on both issues. 
 
The issue of political finance has been tackled by Milan Vaishnav and Eswaran Sridharan in 
Checkbook Elections (2015) where they report that during the last national elections in 2014 in 
India, an estimated US $5 billion was spent by political parties on their campaigns11. This in a 
country that features number 130th on the Global Human Development Index, is a travesty. 
They show how a combination of factors has severely stymied political finance regulation among 
which the state’s strong involvement in access to assets such as land, minerals and real estate 
had led to a ‘system of trading policy and regulatory favours for payments and anonymous 
campaign donations’ (2015:2). To address the issue of irregularities in campaign expenditure, 
they point out some progressive measures had been introduced. These included tax breaks for 
party contributions and the 2005 Right to Information Act that led to a ruling in 2008 ‘compelling 
parties to publicly release their income and expenditure records’ and for candidates to file 
affidavits disclosing ‘their criminal, educational and financial details’ (ibid: 2). Yet despite these, 
political financial regulation remains weak and this is in large measure the result of weak 
enforcement powers of the Election Commission of India that is otherwise immune to political 
                                                      
10 See Maiorano 2015, especially pages 17 - 18 for a fuller account. 
11 Their recent paper ‘Political Finance in a Developing Democracy: the Case of India’ (2018) is a more recent 
iteration. See also Milan Vaishnav When Crime Pays: Money and Muscle in Indian Politics (2017) that explores the 
complex relationship between criminality and money and power in Indian politics. 
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interference through its constitutional sovereignty.  In March 2017, the Government of India 
did pass a new bill on political finance, but as a Finance Bill to bypass the scrutiny of the upper 
house of parliament (where it doesn’t have a voting majority) and effectively undid the good 
work of the 2008 ruling. The new bill has made political finance issues even more opaque and 
vulnerable to manipulation - the cash limit of each contribution was lowered to Rs. 2,000 (from 
Rs.20,000) but the disclosure threshold was left untouched, the previous cap on corporate 
contributions was eliminated and avenues for scrutiny of the source of funding of political 
parties were effectively shut down.   This has further weakened the ECI whose outstanding 
performance in conducting the elections notwithstanding, has now effectively little or no 
leverage over electoral expenditure by political parties. The net result is that the nexus between 
criminality, money and politics continues to be deep and calls the credibility of elections into 
question12.  
 
In an earlier paper, Kapur and Vaishnav (2011), through an imaginative use of quantitative data, 
demonstrated one way of tracing the precise linkages between money and politics and the 
sources of cash during elections by tracking figures of cement sales13. They showed that there 
was a discernible drop in the demand for cement during elections that indicated a relationship 
between builders and politicians. The reason: the cash that fuelled the building industry was re-
routed to politicians to fund their election campaigns causing a temporary contraction in 
cement sales. They argued that the nexus between these two sets of actors – builders and 
politicians – was largely to do with the symbiotic relationship between them; builders needed 
politicians for building permissions and politicians needed somewhere to park their ill-gotten 
wealth. The ideal location for their black money required a ‘financial mechanism that has the 
features of a bank without the traceability of a physical account’ (ibid:8). Real estate - a large 
and dynamic sector in India - had the required characteristics of such a financial mechanism. It 
had an absorptive capacity for large sums of cash owing to the lack of bank loans available to 
this sector (and because cement could only be paid for in cash), it could make the assets easily 
available (by simply pausing construction during elections) and it had the mechanism for 
enforcing the contract because of the mutual dependency with politicians. The value of this 
piece of research was that it made black money visible – by showing the dynamics of its flow 
(measured by cement sale figures) in relationship to electoral rhythms.  
 
But what, we may ask, they do these vast sums of money actually achieve in an election? As 
noted, it clearly buys a party and candidates visibility. In India’s vast parliamentary 
constituencies, reaching every voter is an enormous challenge 14 . With the increasing 
professionalization of election management, it is evident that a vast amount of money is utilised 
in strategic ways to create visibility and to compensate the intermediaries who campaign door-
to-door on behalf of the candidate. But are the campaign coffers also used to buy votes? 
Comparative research across several democracies has found that vote buying is perhaps the 
most unreliable way to win an election. At the end of a volume presenting several national case-
studies Frederic Schaffer presents the following conclusion, ‘vote buying is far from a sure-fire 
strategy — even when accompanied by a panoply of instrumental, coercive, and normative 
                                                      
12 I do not wish to suggest obviously that the influence of money and muscle is in any way unique to Indian 
elections; it is unfortunately a feature of many democracies. 
13 Their paper ‘Builder Politicians and Election Finance (2018) is a more recent iteration.  
14 The average Indian parliamentary constituency is 20 times the size of a UK parliamentary one; a single India MP 
can represent over 2 million voters compared to about 70,000 in the UK.  
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strategies to boost the rate of compliance among voters. Where balloting is at least 
intermittently secret, many people defect’ (2007: 186).  A correlation between expenditure and 
electoral outcome it can be concluded is a weak one and the candidate or party that spends the 
most does not always win elections. And yet it is impossible to deny that money is spent, so 
what does money actually achieve?  Lisa Björkman addresses precisely this issue in a paper 
entitled ‘Meanings of money in elections’ (2014) and shows that ‘multiple logics [are] operative 
in election-time cash flows; actors involved with moving money have divergent and sometimes 
conflicting aspirations, motivations and agendas, within which cash itself plays various roles 
simultaneously’ (Björkman 2014:617). Thus money works in multiple ways rather than merely 
to ‘buy votes’. Bjorkman explains further in another piece co-authored with Jeff Witsoe, a 
scholar of Bihar politics where Witsoe examines the key role that money from the trade in sand 
- a key ingredient for cement and so the real estate industry - plays in political connections.  
Because of the materiality of sand, its value for an industry that largely relies on cash (as we 
have seen above) and the need for it to be transported from its source in riverbeds to 
construction sites across the country, means that the sand mafia that controls its trade has 
become the key gateway into village and regional politics and have emerged as key political 
players connecting the local with a wider stage and providing access to the local.  The authors 
propose that monetary exchanges are not merely transactional but they accomplisg ‘producing, 
performing and (re)configuring of social networks and hierarchies’ ‘ (Björkman and Witsoe 
2018: 153). Their work demonstrates that it is not the fact of money being spent or even the 
amount that is important but the manner in which money is spent that is key and the channels 
through which money flows, because this reveals the strength of a candidate’s networks that 
has real political valence. The ‘multiple logics’ of money reveals the candidate’s ability to make 
the right judgments about how money is spent and it is this ability that voters evaluate. 
 
At this stage in the argument, we can make some important conclusions. First, money does not 
simply buy votes as there is no straightforward correlation between monetary investment and 
electoral results (the richest parties do not always win elections), though everyone recognizes 
that more and more money is spent during elections. Second, as Björkman and Witsoe’s 
argument demonstrates, a discussion of money in elections has to clearly go beyond merely the 
discussion of ‘vote-buying’ as some sort of contractual exchange and recognize instead that 
‘money is a medium and a methodological entryway for … political contestation’ and it is 
exchanged in a ‘dense and diverse field of social relation(s)’ and used for long-term investments 
in networks, reputation and social capital generally(ibid:153.154). They demonstrate that ‘the 
relationship of democratic representation cannot be understood as a social contract, but rather 
as a dense web of socio-material relations in which money plays just one part’ (ibid:154). Thirdly, 
the role of money in Indian elections has to be de-linked from the phenomenon of ‘vote bank’ 
that has been use to describe Indian politics in M N Srinvas’s work in the 1950s, as a captive 
electorate whose votes could be controlled by a traditional patron. Instead, as the examples 
above have demonstrated, in contemporary India, it is the control of mobile and cash rich 
resources such as sand and cement and the possession of hard cash that can be shifted easily, 
rather than land, which provides both financial and social capital. The control of mobile assets 
allows political actors to demonstrate the complexity and spread of their networks and their 
‘reach’ as is popularly described in India. These new networks create new economies and new 
identities that lead to new political and electoral capital – and often financial capital is used to 
gain access to these forms of capital. Finally, as Schaffer indicated in the quote cited above, the 




This was confirmed in the Why India Votes comparative research project across India, where it 
was evident that while people freely accepted bribes/gifts of colour televisions and saris, 
accepting these did not correlate in any way to whom they voted for.  As voters explained, more 
than one party handed out material incentives so while voters coolly accepted gifts from all of 
them, they ultimately voted only for the one they wanted to.  When the question of reciprocity 
was put to them, one woman retorted ‘Do you think my vote can be bought with one sari or a 
TV?!’  Witsoe pithily captured this sentiment by stating, ‘vote buying is acknowledged but rarely 
vote selling’. Voters saw elections as a moment of redistribution when politicians were forced 
to share some of their ill-gotten gains. Thus while voters made the most of the bounty of the 
election season, money did not play a straight forward transactional role by buying votes, but 
worked in far subtler and non-material ways as Björkman and Witsoe show.   
 
In another recent study, Tariq Thachil’s data further deepens our understanding of reciprocity 
in transactional mechanisms (Thachil 2014). In the three large Indian states where he conducted 
his research he examined the perplexing phenomenon of poor voters voting for elite parties 
who were unlikely to articulate their identity and interests and the role of incentives in 
influencing poor voters, as is often assumed by lay observers of politics15. The corollary of such 
an assumption would indicate that incumbent governments with the easiest access to 
patronage goods are in the strongest position to win elections. However evidence shows that 
exactly the opposite is true which is to say, incumbent governments are frequently voted out of 
power and neither does an appeal to identity and ethnic interests sway very poor voters. Why 
then, Thachil asks, do poor voters vote for elite parties? He reports that the provision of services 
was likely to have a greater influence rather than material handouts on determining voter 
choice because for poor voters, basic services of health and education rather than material 
goods are key and any political party that worked towards delivering those was most likely to 
win votes during elections. Voters emerged in his study not merely as clients who voted for the 
party that offered the highest bribe/gift during an election campaign but as discerning citizens 
who rewarded those parties who worked directly or indirectly to make the most essential 
services available to them in the short to medium term. In a creative move, Thachil also probed 
the question of reciprocity and obligation to ask if voters felt in any way obliged to vote for the 
party whose affiliated organisation did excellent and non-partisan work in providing education 
and health care.  The answers to his questions were startling and showed that while people felt 
it was good to reward them with their votes they did not however feel any obligation to do so. 
To the survey question that asked if they ‘felt they had to’ vote for such a party (dena padta hai) 
an overwhelming 87% felt they did not feel this obligation.  But when they were asked whether 
they felt they should give something back (dena chahiye), nearly half of them said they did 
(Thachil 2014: 475).  It is interesting to note that despite good governance being a more 
important factor than incentives in determining choice, it still did not exert a coercive power.   
To the first question - ‘did they have to’ - most voters responded in the negative while only half 
of them conceded only that it was good to reward those who performed well.  
 
These conclusions are similar to discussions in Latin American democracies (Auyero 2001, Lazar 
2004) and in Lazar’s study of a municipal election in the Bolivian town of El Alto, she shows how 
clientilism doesn't have only instrumental and pragmatic aspects, but the relationship that 
voters establish with their political clients have an affective dimension too. The issues of 
                                                      
15 This is of course a classic issue in the study of politics the democracies the world over.  
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reciprocity and promised benefits that come up during an election campaign are the result of 
the immediacy and affective nature of election expenditure, gifts, bribes and patronage in 
contrast to a disinterested and distant bureaucracy that they faced the rest of the time. The 
election thereby presents an opportunity to voters to exercise their judgement, make their 
claims on candidates and parties who are most likely to deliver much-needed ends. Both 
Björkman’s work and Piliavsky’s edited collection of essays show that through their multiple-
level engagement with political actors during a campaign, voters can be seen to be deepening 
the processes of political participation and making the political process more representative 
than less (Björkman 2014, Piliavsky 2014)16.  
 
We have seen thus far, that while there is a transactional quality to the relationship between 
political patrons and their clients through money or services, it is nothing like a straightforward 
exchange. This is confirmed by anthropologists writing about patronage elsewhere who have 
shown that patronage is not a simple transaction of material favours for votes, rather different 
sorts of transactions have moral meanings associated with them (e.g. Lazar 2004). In the Indian 
context, Anastasia Piliavsky has explored some of these moral meanings making a case for a 
distinction between ‘bribes’ and ‘gifts’ in the Indian state of Rajasthan (Piliavsky 2014). She 
draws our attention to the moral categories that people hold in different sorts of giving and 
points to a distinction that is made between incentives such as bribes that are considered 
immoral versus incentives that are offered as gifts that are considered to be virtuous. Thus for 
example, a feast offered to a community, she argues, would be seen as virtuous and legitimate 
whereas stuffing money into someone’s pocket would not. The former, she argues, was not only 
considered to be virtuous but the very dharma of politicians, whereas the latter was considered 
corruption.  Politicians therefore played on this nuance by offering their incentives by making a 
public show of it and by offering to a collective body of people.  But rather than reject such 
material incentivisation during the electoral process that could seriously influence a voter’s 
choice, Piliavsky suggests the very opposite arguing that such public, collective and virtuous 
giving created bonds between politicians and voters that created political loyalty which in turn 
translated into greater political engagement of the electorate during elections. According to 
such a reading, patronage if delivered in morally acceptable terms was ultimately good for 
democracy because it fostered political participation.  This last conclusion is arguable, but a 
clear case is made here for the important role that patronage plays in determining high voter 
turnouts among voters keen to support their patrons. Steve Wilkinson’s article in the same 
volume reinforces this conclusion stating that people vote ‘in part because they value 
democracy, but it is also likely that their vote promises more immediate, tangible and relatively 
valuable returns from patrons or parties. Were it not for the large amount of patronage, Indian 
voter statistics would probably look much more like the other countries where the poor vote 
notably less than the rich’ (Wilkinson in Piliavsky 2014:276).  So while he recognises that part of 
                                                      
16 Ethnographic work has provided excellent analysis of ‘muscle’ or brute force in Indian politics i.e. the social, 
political and financial capital that political actors accrue through their criminal pasts.  A five year, multi-sited study 
AISMA (An Anthropological Investigation of Muscular Politics –ERC 284080) is a collaborative project directed by 
Lucia Michelutti and others and examines the modus operandi of systems of muscular political and economic 
governance in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In a recent article, Piliavsky and Sbriccoli show that people choose 
muscle men or goondas as their leaders, not because of their lack of virtue but because they are able to get things 
done, which they call ‘the ethics of efficacy’, a key feature of political man (see Piliavsky and Sbriccoli 2016). See 
also Kanchan Chandra’s recent volume Democratic Dynasties (2016) that demonstrates how dynastic politics in 




the explanation for voter enthusiasm maybe an attachment to the idea of democracy Wilkinson 
ultimately cites patronage as the deciding factor for high turnouts in India.  
 
To conclude this section on the role of ‘money’ in elections, we can draw some important 
conclusions on the basis of the studies discussed here.  First, to draw a causal link between 
incentives and who people vote for would be hasty. While it is true that millions of voters 
accepted inducements during a campaign it seems impossible to surmise that these 
inducements were enough to buy their vote. Voters clearly felt did not feel much obligation to 
vote for anyone unless they judged them to be worthy. Second, the reason voters felt they could 
defy any coercive pressure exercised by political parties during the campaign was mainly 
because they had recourse to a secret ballot. Third, even when parties performed well during 
their tenure in power, and used this as a coercive measure to persuade voters to vote for them 
again, voters felt they were not obliged to reward them. These are valuable and persuasive 
insights and go a long way in demonstrating that elections are complex sites of popular claim 
making and that if not patronage per se, transactional behaviour - albeit of a longer complex 
nature than immediate reciprocity - among voters remains a strong determinant in their 
decision to vote or not.   
 
But is this a sufficient explanation for explaining the high and rising voter turnouts in Indian 
elections? If the desire for rewards, material or immaterial is not the main reason why people 
vote, rather it is the performance of a political party on delivering basic health and education, 
how then we do explain why voter turnouts continue to remain high even in areas where there 
is an absence of basic services? Why do rich people who do not rely on the state’s services of 
health and education vote? Why do immigrants living in far away cities make expensive journeys 
home to vote? How can we explain the tears of someone who possesses nothing feels bereft 
when unable to vote? In India there is an intensity of people’s commitment to voting that leads 
us to question whether the act of voting itself held some valuable meaning, regardless of 
whether it led to any benefits in the future. Does simply having the right to vote hold significance 
for socially disenfranchised citizens? Are there behavioural pathways alongside the 
transactional that could throw some light on the question of why voting is considered such an 
important act to perform? I turn to these questions in the next section of the paper. 
 
‘Meaning’ in elections 
 
While all of the ‘money’ factors were in evidence in the Why India Votes study during the 2009 
nation elections, when the research question ‘why do you vote’ was posed directly to voters, 
people offered a variety of additional explanations. A frequent immediate riposte was the 
counter question ‘why would you not vote?!’ after which an often-cited reason for voting was 
the assertion that it was the most accessible way of being recognised by the state. As people 
put it, the very presence of their name on an official voters list confirmed that they existed on 
the official landscape, a sort of bureaucratic existentialism. As one person explained, ‘Once we 
vote our name gets recorded in the government’s register and because of this we are accepted 
as the citizens of this village by the Government. And then only will everyone in the wider society 
(samaj) know that we are the citizens of this village’17.  While people knew in theory they were 
Indian citizens, it was the procedure of voting involving identity cards, lists and indelible ink that 
                                                      




made concrete the immaterial nature of this citizenship18. This desire to be recorded on paper 
as confirmation of existence is also reported by Anjaria in his work on illegal street hawkers in 
Mumbai.  He shows how even punitive paper fines were seen to legitimise their presence and 
was used by the hawkers as a means of making future claims. Some kept the receipts for years 
after the original fine as proof of their right to access the streets; ‘the possession of paper 
proving continuous physical presence, even if illegal, confers considerable legal and symbolic 
power’ (Anjaria 2011:64).  Furthermore, the hawkers’ desire for visibility and formal 
acknowledgement was highlighted by their co-operation also with teams conducting surveys, 
who claimed that hawkers were ‘generally quite cooperative and were keen to fill up the forms 
as they felt it might give them some legitimacy for carrying on their activity” (TISS–YUVA 1998:6 
in ibid: 65).  In this landscape of ‘paper truths’ (Tarlo 2003) in the context of elections, by 
presenting themselves in front of the polling officers with their Electoral Photo Identity Cards 
(EPIC), voters who otherwise felt forgotten by the state project were able to make themselves 
visible to it and stake the most fundamental claim of citizenship19.  As one voter explained, ‘I 
realize that to vote is my fundamental right but having done it I will now get a new identity as 
an equal citizen of my village’. So simply put, voting made the idea of citizenship material. People 
acknowledged that while this recognition in itself did not guarantee good governance it at least 
confirmed that the state and the political system had not forgotten about them altogether.  This 
anxiety of socially disadvantaged individuals to register their presence has to be put in 
perspective; they live in an electorate larger that 815 million people and the size of each Indian 
parliamentary constituency is vast and twenty times larger than say the average UK 
constituency. However, many remarked that this was largely possible because of the smooth 
conduct of elections by an efficient electoral machinery which was in stark contrast to the Indian 
bureaucracy which was more an impediment rather enabler.  As Priya, a young woman in Tamil 
Nadu, put it: ‘The government gives us no other benefits, it only respects us in that regard!’ (De 
Neve and Carswell FR: 17–18 in Banerjee 2014:162).  
 
Polling officials themselves couldn’t stress enough the importance of accuracy and probity in 
the conduct of elections to retain the trust of voters in the sanctity of the electoral process and 
reported that unlike their everyday jobs they approached election duty with a mixture of 
excitement and dread, a wedding and examination rolled into one (yeh pariksha bhi hai aur 
shaadi bhi).  In all accounts of Indian bureaucracy, such a sense of commitment and sincerity on 
part of bureaucrats and appreciation by members of the public is unknown (Gupta 2012, 
Mathur 2013). In fact, Akhil Gupta’s work has argued precisely the opposite, that Indian 
bureaucracy and its crippling procedures are a form of structural violence against poverty and 
people.  But the constitutional autonomy of the Election Commission of India and the 
ephemeral nature of electoral bureaucracy that is assembled only for elections made it a 
remarkably different beast to the ‘steel frame’ of the Indian administration20.   
 
The structural violence of the Indian state and its repeated technologies of exploitation and 
extraction has led to a deep suspicion of any official activity including elections and in some 
                                                      
18 Ornit Shani (2016) and her book Making India Democratic (2017) painstakingly charts the story of India’s first 
election, demonstrating how radical it was to introduce universal suffrage in a largely illiterate and poor country 
and the challenges it posed to both the bureaucratic and popular imagination. 
19 See also Bear and Mathur 2015 for an account of boatmen on the Hooghly who use ‘receipts’ as a way to 
legitimise their precarious and informal existence. 
20 See Chapter 4 from Why India Votes? especially pp119-122 for a fuller discussion of the electoral machinery of 
the Election Commission of India. 
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areas people have chosen to ‘keep the state away’ by committing to alternative political 
imaginations and models (Shah 2010, Sundar 2008). In these instances, turnouts at elections 
can be low. However, in north-eastern India, where Naga communities also reject the logic of 
electoral competition in favour of local understandings of strategic political alliances - voter 
turnout rates are much higher than the national average! (Wouters 2014 and 2015). In some 
fascinating recent work, Wouters offers a way of understanding this. He shows that while Nagas 
vote enthusiastically, they do not do so according to rules of multi-party competition but as a 
way to express local values of cohesion and consensus based on different models of social 
allegiances. Thus, because individual votes for particular parties exacerbated difference and 
threatened social cohesion, peer pressure forced groups to come to a consensual choice of a 
single candidate that everyone would vote for so that the local social order was not disturbed. 
The Naga example, in contrast to Shah’s work, shows that even when there is a culturalist 
critique of one of the central tenets of the democratic system i.e. multi-party competition, it 
does not always translate to rejection and in fact here leads to extremely high voter turnout 
rates. If anything, it could be argued that elections provide the opportunity to create social 
cohesion through the process of deliberation and consensual choice of a single candidate. 
 
The evidence increasingly points out that perhaps people often vote not just to support a 
particular party or candidate but for other reasons. Some very interesting data available from 
the 2014 national elections and a few regional elections prior to that when the Election 
Commission of India introduced a new option on all electronic voting machines called NOTA i.e. 
None Of The Above allows us to probe this suggestion further. NOTA allowed voters to ‘spoil 
the ballot paper’ which was not otherwise technically possible on an EVM. The uptake for this 
option was immediate and in 2014, 1.1% of all votes cast across India were registered for NOTA 
and an average of 10,000 votes were cast for it in every constituency. In every subsequent 
election NOTA has registered more and more votes, and while 1.1% is not a large figure in 
absolute terms, in at least nineteen constituencies NOTA votes may have affected the final 
result as its vote share was higher than the winning margin between the first and second 
candidates. In the Bihar state elections in 2015, NOTA polled more than the winning margin in 
a significantly high number of 23 seats and in Chattisgarh’s state elections held in 2013, NOTA 
had polled more than the winning margin in 15 seats.  In the state of Odisha during the 2014 
national elections, NOTA polled more than 4% of the votes21.  There may be several explanations 
for this evidence but we may conclude that whatever the motivation, those voting for NOTA 
view the act of voting as an end in itself.  By bothering to turn up, with the correct ID and 
willingness to queue, only to press a button that doesn’t support any individual or political party, 
significant numbers of voters appear to be sending the message that they believe there is some 
intrinsic merit in the act of voting without necessarily using it to support anyone in particular. 
The figures for NOTA votes thus draws attention to the act of voting itself and raises the 
possibility that the vote is not used only instrumentally to achieve a particular result but perhaps 
also to achieve a symbolic meaning. 
 
The following vignette from a scene on polling day during the 2009 national elections provides 
a glimpse into the potency of this symbolism: 
 
One morning in May, when the agricultural grain market was winding down 
from a busy season of wheat sales, we found Rukmini Bai, an elderly woman 
                                                      
21 The NOTA option is not available in Panchayat elections, the most local tier of elections. 
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who worked in the trading yard, wiping away tears with the end of her sari. 
She was inconsolable, and explained that the day before she had been unable 
to vote at the elections because she did not have the correct identification. 
She had produced other pieces of paper with no success, so in the end, she 
had to wait outside the polling booth and watch everyone else emerge with 
newly-inked fingers proving they had cast their vote, while her own remained 
bare. When we asked why this upset her so much she explained that every 
vote was important and she did not want to waste hers. When we tried to 
console her saying that it was after all, only one vote, and that her missing vote 
in unlikely to affect the outcome, she paused amidst her tears and said, ‘You 
know what my job is! My work is to sweep up all the grain that falls from the 
sacks and the weighing scales on the floor. At the end of the day, I sell what I 
have collected and I am allowed to keep half the money. That is my income. 
So you see, I spend all day chasing every last grain because I understand their 
value. On the floor they look insignificant, just one isolated grain of wheat, but 
each grain that is added to the heap determines what I earn. My vote is like 
those grains of wheat’22. 
 
Rukmini Bai’s description of her vote and its significance presents an altogether different 
understanding of the meaning of the vote than those we have considered so far.  By stating that 
her single vote is valuable, she rejects the logic of the aggregate that renders an individual vote 
as irrelevant. She draws our attention to the fact that it is thousands and millions of people like 
her, with their single votes, who in fact can make up a collective. She also rejects the reasoning 
of the free rider who hides within this collective by relying on the conscientiousness of others 
by abstaining from doing their bit. In fact, as the vignette demonstrates she is distraught 
precisely because she has been unable to add her own opinion to the collective, fully knowing 
as her analogy indicates, that it will be indistinguishable from the others as wheat grains are in 
a sack.  Her tears are for her failure to add her vote to the others, to make her presence felt and 
to belong to a collective. We knew that over a period of several years Rukmini Bai had managed 
to vote on some occasions and not on others and this had not affected the material reality of 
her life either way. Despite this, her sense of loss at not being able to vote and its accompanying 
desire to participate indicated that elections and the ability to vote carried a set of meanings 
that went beyond money or instrumentalism. I would argue, that any theory of why people vote 
needs to accommodate this kind of affective attachment to the act of voting. To fully understand 
this expressive aspect of the vote, elections need to be seen within a wider social context.  
 
Elections in India bring with them a distinct political temporality and are clearly marked off from 
everyday time and events. Election Day is a public holiday in India, which immediately turns the 
normal rhythm of daily life into a special one. People tend to rise early to arrange their day 
around the trip to the polling station. In rural India, women accelerate their household tasks to 
complete them before a quick bath to get dressed in their ‘best’ saris for the outing. Village men 
tend to make their trip to the polling station early so that they can free up the rest of the day 
for getting on with other things or to simply exchange news and gossip of the election with 
others as events unfolds. The rhythm of the day is much like it is for other festival days when 
the normality of everydayness is suspended to create a specialness through a different domestic 
routine, nice clothes, special foods and luxuries of extended play and television-watching for 
                                                      
22 (Krishnamurthy FR:1 in Banerjee 2014:2). 
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families. Election Day in India comes as a culmination of a long period of campaigning that 
attains a carnival like atmosphere and is similar to what Auyero describes as the ‘time of 
elections’ in Brazil (Auyero 2000; 2001).  
 
Tocqueville provides an account of an American election and despite only eleven elections 
having been held before his visit, the pattern seemed to have been set for perpetuity and 
resonates with the Indian scenario: ‘As the election draws near, intrigues intensify, and agitation 
increases and spreads. The citizens divide into several camps, each behind his candidate. A fever 
grips the entire nation. The election becomes the daily grist of the public papers, the subject of 
private conversation, the aim of all activity, the object of all thought, the sole interest of the 
moment’. And then as it ends ‘ardor dissipates, calm is restored, and the river, having briefly 
overflowed its banks, returns peacefully to its bed’23. This change in rhythm is what all rituals 
bring to replace the banality of the everyday by rearranging life’s little jobs so that it is unlike all 
others.  
 
The polling station itself is physically marked off from the rest of the neighbourhood by security 
guards and officials24. Political party workers are permitted to set up desks on the perimeter to 
hand people their voting slips, check off names and provide information to anyone who needs 
it. For the voters therefore, once they have passed this point, there is a noticeable lessening of 
the din and any external influences of political parties, their workers and opinion-givers are shut 
out and the focus shifts to the job at hand. As they enter the voting space, conversation, even 
among voters who come with others, tends to fade.  At the booth itself queues are mostly 
orderly and formed strictly on the basis of a first-come-first-served basis, which in itself is a 
relatively rare occurrence in public spaces in India. Further, the composition of a queue at a 
polling station is unlike any other public queue in India for while there might be in theory be 
democratic access to public spaces, only particular groups of people either through self-
selection or social exclusion occupy them at any time25. In a polling queue however, there is 
evidence of a genuine social mix. In cities, it is common for the same neighbourhood to contain 
the very wealthy alongside those whose income is significantly lower (who often provide 
domestic services for the wealthy and live nearby); in villages, a polling station often serves 
more than one village and so strangers and men and women are forced to mingle, though in 
separate queues. As a result, the queue at a polling station in India is a fairly unique artefact of 
public culture and is perhaps the only occasion when Indian citizens experience the social 
diversity that exists in the country but is never actually experienced because of segregated 
public interactions. Thus, for instance in 2009 in Tamil Nadu we witnessed ‘the wealthier 
Gounders to the middle-ranking Nadars and Barbers to Adi Dravida Christians and SC Matharis 
all milling about together’ (De Neve and Carswell FR: 48 in Banerjee 2014: 133). In another part 
of the country, an upper-caste Rajput woman commented that in her natal village dominated 
by the upper caste Rajputs, it would have been impossible to imagine them rubbing shoulders 
with a low caste Chamar woman in any other context but the voting queue.  The orderliness is 
also an uncommon occurrence. To be able to wait peacefully in line with enough room, 
                                                      
23 Quote from de Tocqueville taken from Joseph Epstein Alexis De Tocqueville: Democracy’s Guide Harper 2006:58. 
24 The following account is based on the accounts of the dozen researchers from different parts of the country 
involved in the Why India Votes project who were present on polling day in polling booths across the country and 
my personal experience of observing elections for over fifteen years in different parts of India. I recognize however 
that this description may not match the reality equally in all parts of India. 
25 It should be noted that violence continues to be used in twenty-first century India to refuse entry rights to lower 
castes and women to places of worship. 
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alongside a mixed bag of strangers without fear, under the watchful eye of officials, creates a 
sense of civility that is in marked contrast to the world outside.  In this sense, the polling station 
is an example of what Neyazi, Tanabe and Ishizaka call a ‘vernacular public arena’ (2014) that is 
created as the result of the encounter between a diverse society and political institutions. Such 
a space they argue stands apart from state and society and problematises ‘the connection 
between the languages and lifeworlds of the vernacular and discourses and activities in the 
public arena and the resulting vitalisation of the public arena in which diverse vernacular social 
groups participate’.  In the case of the polling station, the official conduct of elections by the 
state, the solemnity of the polling process and the unusually diverse composition of the voting 
queue created such a vernacular public arena in which citizens participated in an altogether 
new register.  
 
Inside the booth itself, the atmosphere is of quiet efficiency. Polling agents from the contesting 
political parties are allowed to be present but election officials outnumber them and dominate 
the proceedings. For some, the simple fact of having their name called out in full by an official 
with no ascriptions of kinship or community was in itself meaningful. As Tiratdas Mahant a 
young Kabirpanthi, whose community faces a constant stigma of untouchability said, ‘voting 
also gives me a feeling of being identified as a citizen with equal rights to anyone else’.   By being 
identified as a citizen rather than by his caste, Tiratdas could instantly tap into an identity that 
was new and provided by the Indian constitution rather than society. The accessibility of the 
technology of voting on a simple machine as an EVM is designed to be, rather than ballot paper 
that has the potential to stigmatize the illiterate took this process of inclusion further26. And 
most of all, it was the secrecy of the ballot that made voting an unusual and desirable activity. 
Young women reported that the moment of casting their vote was perhaps the only time when 
they felt their thoughts and emotions not being controlled by their mother-in-law, husband and 
elders; others welcomed the space that the ballot box gave them to think clearly by silencing 
the cacophony of social opinion and weeks of election campaigning persuading them to vote 
for this or that party. It is no wonder that the introduction of the secret ballot as an integral 
element of democratic voting practice was so a hotly contested with strong arguments on both 
sides27.  In the end, the secret ballot was adopted and created the space for a voter, who in that 
moment with the ballot box, could stand apart from the context in which she was otherwise 
embedded to act as an autonomous individual exercising her choice. As the young women 
indicated, the voting booth gave them the opportunity to think as a citizen and voter, rather 
than as a woman encumbered by the structures of patriarchy outside it28.  
                                                      
26 Akhil Gupta notes how the routine insistence on paperwork by bureaucracy ‘bestowed a degree of arbitrariness 
to the biopolitical project…[even though] the product of such arbitrariness was not in any critical way mediated by 
literacy, by whether the poor person in question knew how to read and write. ….[and so] literacy is complexly 
articulated with structural violence…it mediates and structures such violence’ (Gupta 2012:232-233). India’s 
literacy rate according to the most recently available census data of 2011 is 74.04% 
27 For an overview of the global history of voting see Gilmartin 2012, especially pp 407-409 
28 An extremely worrying development since the adoption of the EVMs is how it has compromised the secrecy of 
the ballot. Earlier, ballot papers used to shuffled in a barrel before being counted, so booth wise polling patterns 
could not be identified. However, EVM votes are counted by machine, thereby revealing accurate data of voting 
patterns for every polling booth that covers a population of 1000-1200 voters.  To correct this, the Election 
Commission of India developed a machine called the ‘Totaliser’ that would electronically ‘mix’ the votes but this 
has been opposed by the BJP and other parties, no doubt because booth wise data is very useful in ‘managing’ 
the supporters and detractors with carrots and sticks respectively. While controversies about whether EVMs can 
be ‘hacked’ are continuous, to my mind, it is the absolute necessity of the Totaliser that is the real issue. Without 




 Voters emerging from a polling station were asked how they felt having voted they often 
remarked that ‘it was unlike any other experience in their lives’ and many said they felt they 
were ‘king for a day’ (ek din ka sultan) and the vote felt like a weapon.  This sense of 
empowerment and transcending the social contexts of their lives is what Gilmartin describes as 
‘sovereignty’s enchanted essence’ (2012:412) and it is entirely apt that voters compared the 
atmosphere to the garbgrha of a temple, the sanctum sanctorum where the deity is located 
and is the high point of a devotee’s visit to the temple. One voter drew out the metaphor saying, 
‘The EVM is like a god who is sitting inside and no one except the devout can enter. Even the 
priest (i.e. polling officer) has to sit outside this area’. It was no surprise that people used the 
word darsan to describe this moment to signify a personal and intimate communion between 
the divine and deity in a temple29. People like Hiral, a first-time voter drew our attention to how 
this felt. ‘I wanted to feel that experience, I wanted to press the button on EVM and I wanted 
to see how it functions. And now I am very happy because I will now be considered a citizen of 
this country’. The importance of the secret ballot was therefore manifold. At the most important 
level, it allowed the voter complete privacy, as a sovereign citizen to make their political choice. 
And Hiral’s assertion above ‘I wanted to press the button on EVM…’ indicates that the sheer 
materiality of the EVM, the feel of the button he could touch with his finger, reminds us of what 
Chris Pinney calls ‘corpothetics’ (sensory, corporeal aesthetics) which he argues is part of ‘a 
whole range of culturally diverse popular practices that stress mutuality and corporeality in 
spaces as varied as those of religious devotion and cinematic pleasure’ (Pinney 2004:193).  We 
could argue that the act of voting is another example of such a popular practice which when 
performed creates a whole new experience. 
 
Voters carried some of the ‘enchanted essence’ of the polling booth back into the reality 
outside. Nineteen-year-old Gayatri Banjare, a young Dalit woman voting for the first time, felt 
it was as if she was being noticed and taken seriously for the first time in the village where she 
grew up. This recognition was obviously desirable: ‘When I walk to the booth and cast my vote, 
people notice me and I feel great about it’ is how she put it. And the fleeting but potent 
awareness of equality inside the polling booth lingered into an unequal society. As a man in 
Bihar put it, ‘It is because I have a right to vote that I feel I am valued in society’ (samaj main 
hamari bhi value hai). The equivalence of universal suffrage and the principle of ‘one man one 
vote’ held enormous significance in a society of pernicious inequality as it did for a young Dalit 
law student whose community faces some of the worst atrocities: ‘I enjoy the identity of being 
equal with everyone at least for one day’. Another woman who belonged to a low-caste Chamar 
community said: ‘I realized the value of casting my vote through the experience of standing in 
the same line and in the same room alongside people of other castes’.  The identical mark made 
with indelible black ink on each voter’s left index finger to avoid fraud, served as an unintended 
material proof of social equivalence. One young woman in Tamil Nadu said proudly as she 
emerged from the polling station, drawing attention to her left hand: ‘After this mark we are all 
the same’ (De Neve and Carswell FR : 20 in Banerjee 2014 : 159).  
 
Given the widespread intimidation and coercion that exists during Indian elections, people 
recognised that being able to vote was a privilege they did not take for granted. One woman 
told us that in her elite Jat dominated natal village, her caste members had been forcibly kept 
away from voting and so her own first time experience of visiting the polling station after 
                                                      
29 See Diana Eck 1981:5 and Pinney 2004 on darsan 
 
 17 
marriage (in a different village) felt momentous. One person even went so far as to say that the 
act of voting made them human: ‘If we don’t vote then what is the difference between human 
beings and the animals? … Have you heard of animals going to vote? (Jani FR: 9 in Banerjee 
2014:160). In turn, the right to be able to vote, and the freedom to exercise it generated a sense 
of duty among voters. People called it their dharma (moral duty) and they argued that it was a 
duty, even a ‘sacred duty’, to exercise their right to vote. Fulfilling this duty was seen as selfless 
act that had to be done without necessarily expecting a material return. The idea of ‘giving’ your 
vote was frequently explained by disaggregating the Hindi word for vote (matdan), which is 
composed of two words mat (opinion) and dan (giving)30.  The essential characteristic of the 
nature of dan - of ‘giving without material expectation’ as one would to the priest or to the poor 
as a way of gaining virtue - was emphasized. Thus the duty or dharma of voting was the dan of 
one’s vote, which was performed as an important act in itself and the action of giving it accrued 
virtue to the giver.  As we will recall from our earlier discussion of transactional factors, receiving 
anything in return for voting was never guaranteed and so people had to ‘give’ their vote 
without expectation or in vain hope and simply because it was the right thing to do. 
 
It was no surprise then that as the evening of Election Day drew close, the atmosphere in the 
village was tinged with wistful satisfaction, as at the close of an important event.  Even the 
polling officers for whom elections meant extra work were not immune to this mood. They 
remarked on the extraordinary camaraderie created among the officials who met as strangers 
but worked together as a team to achieve the common goal of conducting another good 
election. As a poetic bank teller from Bihar put it, reminding us of Tocqueville’s riverine 
metaphor for elections ‘Here we flow together like a single river, but when we leave this booth, 
we will all revert to becoming separate tributaries’ (yahan par toh hum sab pani ke jaise hain, 
bahar ja kar saab apne apne rang mein dhal jayenge)31.  It was as if with the conclusion of voting, 
officials and voters alike were left bereft of the transient glimpse of something extraordinary 
that was quite unlike everyday life. 
 
  
                                                      
30 See Banerjee 2014:98-100 for a longer discussion of vote as dan. 





Yogendra Yadav has argued that elections are a sort of ‘hinge’ that connect the messy 
vernacular social life with the formal institutions of democracy (Yadav 2010) and the discussion 
above has shown the surprises thrown up by this temporary coming together of two very 
different social worlds.  In this paper, these two worlds are roughly characterized as ‘money’ 
and ‘meaning’. As we have seen, on Election Day, the messy and iniquitous world of ‘society’, 
marked by a series of transactional gestures involving money and muscle is temporarily 
dislodged to create an alternative social order that goes some way in realising the ‘meaning’ of 
the democratic potential of the values of citizenship and fairness.  Unsurprisingly, it is poor and 
socially disadvantaged voters who valued this dislodgement most acutely and continue to vote 
in large numbers. There have been recent claims that seem to suggest that liberal citizenship is 
for the elites and the poor have an imperfect version of a more clientelistic citizenship. The first 
is based on a juridical concept of citizenship and constitutes ‘civil society’ as would be 
understood in liberal democratic theory and the rest constitute something less so, namely 
‘political society’. This formulation proposed by Partha Chatterjee (2006), has since been 
contested by many who have found that it is not supported by empirical evidence (Baviskar and 
Sundar 2008; Gudavarthi 2012; Roy forthcoming; among others). The evidence presented here 
has shown that the distinction between these two categories may be overdrawn because even 
members of Chatterjee’s ‘political’ society who are entangled in clientelistic pressures are able 
to retain a sense of liberal citizenship – embodied through the values of autonomy, judgement 
and duty that find expression in the act of voting. Elections thus play a significant role in creating 
and sustaining that sense of citizenship.  
 
As is evident multiple motivations are at play when people cast their vote in an election. By 
examining elections and the electorate in the large and tumultuous democracy of India, we find 
that voters, especially members of Chatterjee’s ‘political society’ respond to material factors 
such as cash, incentives, patronage and the threat of violence through transactional behaviour.  
But when the same voters were asked why they voted, they also outlined non-transactional 
factors that created meaning in the voting process and the act of voting itself. A number of 
factors contributed to this – the efficiency of the bureaucratic machinery that made a genuine 
attempt to create free and fair elections, the secret ballot and the social mixing and solemnity 
at polling stations where everybody was treated the same. Voters went so far as to compare 
the experience of casting their vote to a darsan of the divine and as Diana Eck reminds us a 
crucial element of darsan is not simply to be able to see the deity, but also to be seen by it and 
be blessed by the divine (Eck 1981). Thus, just as standing face to face in front of the deity is a 
vital element of worship, voters drew attention to the opportunity that an election provided in 
both seeing the state and being seen by it. 
 
It is vital for any democracy to create such spaces for the expression of individual choice and 
the sovereign individual. Of course, the portrayal of an Indian voter as ‘an autonomous moral 
agent, transcending the bonds of society’ (Gilmartin 2012:411) will be rightfully challenged by 
many because of the role that patronage and money in Indian elections. It would nevertheless 
be hasty to ignore the subjective experience of voters themselves who despite the coercive and 
corrupt practices of politicians, saw the act of voting as a meaningful act of citizenship. It is for 
this reason that the universal right to vote creates a sense of duty that drives voter turnout 
figures up in every election, reflecting the constitutional ambition to create a ‘sacred 
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individuality as a property of the self … as it was linked to the notion of human equality, dignity 
and reciprocal recognition’ (ibid:411). The meaning of the vote is thus as much a part of the 
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